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1Abstract
Critics of Darwinian approaches to the study of the evolution of human and social behavior often express their 
dissent claiming that cultural evolution is Lamarckian� By this they mean two things� First, that contrary to 
natural selection, in Lamarckian mechanisms of use and disuse plus the inheritance of acquired traits, the modi-
fications in an organism arise as a solution to the environmental problem at hand, i�e�, variation is not blind; and 
second, that the acquired trait is transmitted to the offspring by imitation or learning�
In this paper I will reconstruct informally the theory of natural selection as it was used by Darwin in order to 
show that the fact that cultural evolution has these Lamarckian features does not imply that it cannot evolve 
by natural selection� The appeal to Darwin’s original writings has two advantages� On the one hand, the way 
he applies the theory makes it more transparent than in contemporary applications which are its fundamental 
concepts and structure� On the other, Darwin holds that Lamarckian mechanisms can be causally responsible 
for variations on which natural selection operates, thus showing that it is possible to hold a theory of natural 
selection that is not incompatible with these alleged Lamarckian features of cultural evolution�
KEYWORDS: NATURAL SELECTION, CULTURAL EVOLUTION, DARWIN, STRUCTURE OF THE THEORY OF 
NATURAL SELECTION
Resumen
Los críticos de los enfoques que intentan estudiar la evolución conductual humana y social con enfoques dar-
winianos suelen describir tal rechazo con la afirmación: “La evolución cultural es lamarckiana”� Con esto se 
refieren, por un lado, al hecho de que, supuestamente a diferencia de la selección natural, en los mecanismos 
lamarckianos de uso y desuso más la herencia de caracteres adquiridos, la modificación en el rasgo del organ-
ismo en cuestión surge como solución al problema ambiental en juego, la variación no es ciega, y por el otro, 
que el rasgo adquirido se transmite a la descendencia� Así, los rasgos culturales se proponen para solucionar 
ciertos problemas ambientales y son transmitidos a la descendencia por imitación o aprendizaje�
En este trabajo se reconstruirá informalmente la teoría de la selección natural tal como era utilizada por Darwin 
con el objetivo de mostrar que el hecho de que la evolución cultural tenga estas características lamarckianas no 
implica que no puede evolucionar por selección natural� La apelación a los escritos originales de Darwin tiene 
dos beneficios� Por un lado la forma en que aplica la teoría resulta más transparente que en las aplicaciones 
actuales cuáles son los conceptos fundamentales de la teoría y cómo es su estructura� Por el otro, Darwin sos-
tiene que los mecanismos lamarckianos pueden ser causantes de la variación sobre la cual la selección natural 
funciona, mostrando que es posible sostener una teoría de la selección natural que no sea incompatible con 
estos supuestos rasgos lamarckianos de la evolución cultural�
PALABRAS CLAVE: SELECCIÓN NATURAL, EVOLUCIÓN CULTURAL, DARWIN, ESTRUCTURA DE LA TEO-
RÍA DE LA SELECCIÓN NATURAL� 
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Introduction
There are different ways of applying the theories of Darwinian evolutionary biology to cultural evolution, 
that is, to evolutionary processes in which inheritance does not proceed through genetic information� 
There are, consequently, a number of critics of these attempts� Independently of the relevance of the 
reasons such critics have for rejecting the application of evolutionary theories to the cultural realm, they 
usually use the claim that cultural evolution is Lamarckian as their banner� The target of this attack is 
in particular the application of natural selection to the evolution of cultural traits�
This paper proceeds at a metatheoretical level of conceptual elucidation� Independently of how 
cultural evolution does in fact occur, which is of the interest of scientists in the corresponding areas, 
my intention is to analyze conceptually whether there is an inconsistency between some versions 
of Lamarckism and Darwinism� My aim is to show that, even if cultural evolution had certain 
Lamarckian features – in particular, if variations were directed or if the direct instruction of the 
environment was possible in a sense to be explained later – this would not imply that the theory 
of natural selection cannot be applied to it� Someone might consider, however, that if the variation 
over which natural selection is to operate is not blind, such operation is superfluous� I believe this 
happens because the theory has not been adequately presented� I will, therefore, put forward an 
informal reconstruction of the theory of natural selection as it was used by Darwin� I will show how 
this theory did not in any sense presuppose that variation was blind� In fact, for Darwin, Lamarckian 
mechanisms of use and disuse were some of the mechanisms responsible for the variation required 
for natural selection to work�
This work, therefore, falls within the scope of the reconstructive and elucidatory goals established by 
logical positivists (Hahn et al� 1929)� The reconstructive tools they provided, however, have over the 
years turned out unsatisfactory� I will utilize the more powerful and sophisticated tools provided by 
metatheoretical structuralism (but in an informal fashion) (Balzer et al� 1987)�
Lamarkian cultural evolution
Although he was not the first to hold this idea (e�g� Medawar 1960), Stephen Jay Gould has been one 
of the authors that have insisted the most on the Lamarckian character of cultural evolution:
“Cultural evolution has progressed at rates that Darwinian processes cannot begin to approach� 
Darwinian evolution continues in Homo sapiens, but at rates so slow that it no longer has much 
impact on our history� This crux in the earth’s history has been reached because Lamarckian 
processes have finally been unleashed upon it� Human cultural evolution, in strong opposition 
to our biological history, is Lamarckian in character� What we learn in one generation, we 
transmit directly by teaching and writing� Acquired characters are inherited in technology and 
culture “ (Gould 1980: 83-84)�
Or, in a more recent text:
“Human culture has introduced a new style of change to our planet, a form that Lamarck mistakenly 
advocated for biological evolution, but that does truly regulate cultural change–inheritance of 
acquired characters� Whatever we devise or improve in our lives, we pass directly to our offspring 
as machines and written instructions� Each generation can add, ameliorate, and pass on, thus 
imparting a progressive character to our technological artifacts” (Gould 1993: 215-216)� 
These texts seem to point to the fact that cultural traits are acquired during ontogenetic processes of 
development and are transmitted to offspring nor through genetic material, but through learning� But 
if the claim that cultural evolution is Lamarckian only intends to state this, then it becomes trivial� 
Given that cultural evolution is defined as the evolution of traits that does not involve any kind of 
genetic change, the prase “cultural evolution is Lamarckian” means the same as “cultural evolution 
is cultural”, and it is safe to assume that this is not the point (Kronfeldner 2007: 502)� The main point 
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has to do with the way in which the traits that are transmitted to the offspring are acquired� In the 
phrase “acquired traits are inherited” a more restricted sense of “acquired” is usually presupposed, 
one that expresses the acquisition of traits adequate to solve certain environmental problem as a 
response to the environmental problem itself (Kronfeldner 2007: 495)� This is the reason why, for 
instance, Boyd and Richardson characterize the cultural process of problem solving as Lamarckian 
(Boyd et al� 1985, p� 82)� Variation would not be blind, but would rather be guided by the resolution 
of the problem at hand (Fog 1999: 65-67 )� And this is the central point according to Gould himself:
“Why can’t organisms figure out what would do them good, develop those adaptative features 
by dint of effort during their lifetimes, and the pass those improvements to their offspring 
in the form of altered heredity? We call such a putative mechanism “Lamarckism” or “the 
inheritance of acquired characters”” (Gould 1996: 221)�
Lamarck explains the adaptation of organisms to their environment mainly through two laws 
(Lamarck 1809, chap� VII):
First law: During the life of animals, they exercise the use of certain organs and others get disused� 
The used ones get strengthened and developed, the others get weakened� (Commonly called the “law 
of use and disuse of organs”)�
Second law: The small and gradual changes individuals of a species experience throughout their lives 
are transmitted to their offspring� (The “law of inheritance of acquired traits” in the restricted sense)�
The use of a given organ to solve some problem peculiar to the environment is what triggers the 
development of the organ improving previous solutions� Although the law of use and disuse can 
hardly be applied literally to cultural evolution, it is this feature of the way that variation arises that 
seems to be in play here� Indeed, according to many authors, it would be an essential feature of the 
theory of natural selection that the variation over which it operates is random, blind or decoupled 
(e�g�  Fracchia et al� 2005:17; Gomila 2009: 340; Gould 1996: 221)�
According to Campbell, for variations to be blind they must meet the following requirements 
(Campbell 1974, p� 421):
1� They must arise without a prior knowledge of which ones, if any, are going to be selected for�
2� They are independent of the environmental conditions at the moment of their occurrence�
3� The occurrence of each trial is not correlated with the solution, that is, specific correct trials 
are not more probable that the rest�
4� A variation succeeding an incorrect trial is not a correction of it�
It can easily be seen why mechanisms as use and disuse, which presuppose the inheritance of acquired 
traits, would not be blind� They would not satisfy the second requirement, since environmental 
conditions would be causally responsible for successful variation, and neither the third, because 
successful variations would be more probable than unsuccessful ones� If the variation postulated 
by the theory of natural selection is blind, then the theory of natural selection is inconsistent with 
Lamarck’s first law� Of course, it is precisely this blindness that has been found attractive by some 
authors in order to think of cultural change� For instance, it is this feature that drives Popper into 
considering the change of scientific theories as analogous to biological evolution� Just as there is no 
direct instruction from the environment in biological evolution, there is no inductive process from 
experience to the discovery of new theories in the logic of scientific research (Popper 1974, pp� 
34-41)� Moreover, the fact that the theory of natural selection can operate over variations that are 
relatively spontaneous is what gives it much more explanatory scope than Lamarck’s theory� Since 
Darwin accepted these two Lamarckian laws (unlike other aspects of his theory, as the tendency 
towards complexity that according to Lamarck drove evolution), but considered that the majority of 
the traits adequate for the environment remained unexplained:
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 “Naturalists continually refer to external conditions, such as climate, food, &c�, as the only 
possible cause of variation� In one very limited sense, as we shall hereafter see, this may be 
true; but it is preposterous to attribute to mere external conditions, the structure, for instance, 
of the woodpecker, with its feet, tail, beak, and tongue, so admirably adapted to catch insects 
under the bark of trees� In the case of the misseltoe, which draws its nourishment from certain 
trees, which has seeds that must be transported by certain birds, and which has flowers with 
separate sexes absolutely requiring the agency of certain insects to bring pollen from one 
flower to the other, it is equally preposterous to account for the structure of this parasite, with 
its relations to several distinct organic beings, by the effects of external conditions, or of habit, 
or of the volition of the plant itself” (Darwin 1859, p� 3)� 
The reference to explanation by means of habit or the will points to the fact that use and disuse presuppose 
the will or the habit of using or not using certain organ�
Part of the explanatory power of the theory, then, lies in that it is not necessary to accept any mechanism 
of direct instruction by the environment in order for adaptation to such environment to be increased� But, 
is it necessary that variation in all cases be independent in this sense from the environment? Variation 
can be blind, but must it be so? If that was the case, then, indeed, the theory of natural selection would be 
inconsistent with direct instruction by the environment and, if cultural traits arise as a direct response to 
environmental problems, then the theory of natural selection could not be coherently applied to cultural 
evolution�
It is customary to characterize the theory of natural selection using the expression “blind variation and 
selective retention”� I believe there are two reasons why it is affirmed that variation must be blind� On the 
one hand, it is because ordinary applications of the theory involve genetically determined traits, and current 
molecular biology has shown (though previous authors such as Weissmann had already suggested it) that 
there is no system that allows modifications acquired during the process of ontogenetic development to 
be inscribed into the genome that will be passed on to the offspring� The other reason is that, since there is 
not any good reconstruction and presentation of the theory of natural selection, it is not clear why a case 
of selection over variations produced in a non blind manner would count as a case of natural selection 
rather than of the operation of Lamarckian laws� Thus, for instance, Richards describes Toulmin’s appeal 
to a non-blind or, in the latter’s own terminology, “coupled” theory of natural selection to account for the 
evolution of conceptual populations (Toulmin 1972, pp� 324-340), as an abandonment of natural selection 
altogether and an acceptance of a Lamarckian mechanism (Richards 1987, p� 578)�
Even those authors that are not committed to blind variation and that purport to provide a version of the 
theory of natural selection general enough as to allow for its application to cultural phenomena present 
it poorly as consisting of the three principles of variation, reproduction and selection, without much 
elucidation of such concepts and the way they are applied (Álvarez 2009: 321; Fog 1999: 60)� This makes 
room for unfounded suspicions about whether, in effect, it is the same theory which is operating� I will 
now present a reconstruction of the theory of natural selection that, though informal and sketchy, suffices 
for showing that this theory is more complex than the mere variation and selection� The presentation of its 
fundamental concepts, the form of its fundamental law and the different ways in which the latter is applied 
in its special laws, will erase any fear that accepting directed variations for natural selection destroys what 
is peculiar to the theory�
The Darwinian Theory of Natural Selection
As is well known, what Darwin wants to explain with the theory of natural selection (TNS) is certain 
adequacy or adjustment of organisms to their environment� 
For instance:
“The giraffe, by its lofty stature, much elongated neck, fore-legs, head and tongue, has its 
whole frame beautifully adapted for browsing on the higher branches of trees� It can thus 
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obtain food beyond the reach of the other Ungulata or hoofed animals inhabiting the same 
country; and this must be a great advantage to it during dearths” (Darwin 1872, p� 177)�
The way Darwin explains the fixation of this trait in the population of giraffes is the following:
“So under nature with the nascent giraffe, the individuals which were the highest browsers 
and were able during dearths to reach even an inch or two above the others, will often have 
been preserved; for they will have roamed over the whole country in search of food� That the 
individuals of the same species often differ slightly in the relative lengths of all their parts may 
be seen in many works of natural history, in which careful measurements are given� These 
slight proportional differences, due to the laws of growth and variation, are not of the slightest 
use or importance to most species� But it will have been otherwise with he nascent giraffe, 
considering its probable habits of life; for those individuals which had some one part or several 
parts of their bodies rather more elongated than usual, would generally have survived. These 
will have intercrossed and left offspring, either inheriting the same bodily peculiarities, or with 
a tendency to vary again in the same manner; whilst the individuals, less favoured in the same 
respects, will have been the most liable to perish” (Darwin 1872, pp� 177-178, my emphasis)�
If we consider, following metatheoretical structuralism, that TNS’s fundamental law is that statement 
in which the fundamental concepts of TNS appear related (Balzer, Moulines & Sneed 1987, p� 19), 
we can extract an instantiation of the fundamental law of TNS from the previous passage:
Giraffes with the longer necks, fore-legs, heads and tongues are more effective in feeding from 
the higher branches of trees, thus improving their survival and, consequently, their differential 
reproductive success.
Nothing seems superfluous in this statement� If we removed any if its parts, the explanation it provides 
would falter� If the function assigned to the trait by the organism, that of reaching the higher branches 
of trees, is removed, we would not know why such trait could improve survival� It could improve it 
for other reasons, for instance, by intimidating possible predators� This would be an alternative and 
competing explanation to the one offered by Darwin� If we remove the improvement in survival, the 
relation between the trait and reproductive success would remain indeterminate� As we will see, this 
connection is not always established by improvement in survival�
We can find this very explanatory structure in other places in the Origin. For instance, it is possible to 
give a similar explanation in answer to the question “How was it that certain population of caterpillars 
acquired shapes similar to those of the branches in which they feed that allow them to pass unnoticed 
in order to protect them from predators?”
“But in all the foregoing cases the insects in their original state no doubt presented some rude 
and accidental resemblance to an object commonly found in the stations frequented by them� 
Nor is this at all improbable, considering the almost infinite number of surrounding objects and 
the diversity in form and colour of the hosts of insects which exist� As some rude resemblance 
is necessary for the first start, we can understand how it is that the larger and higher animals 
do not (with the exception, as far as I know, of one fish) resemble for the sake of protection 
special objects, but only the surface which commonly surrounds them, and this chiefly in 
colour� Assuming that an insect originally happened to resemble in some degree a dead twig or 
a decayed leaf, and that it varied slightly in many ways, then all the variations which rendered 
the insect at all more like any such object, and thus favoured its escape, would be preserved, 
whilst other variations would be neglected and ultimately lost; or, if they rendered the insect at 
all less like the imitated object, they would be eliminated” (Darwin 1872, p� 182)� 
In this case the law-like statement presupposed is the following:
Caterpillars whose shape and color allow them to camouflage with the plant on which they feed tend 
to leave more descendants in virtue of having improved their survival in their environment.
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Abstracting from these two statements we come closer to what I consider to be the fundamental law 
of TNS:
Individuals with traits that perform certain function more efficiently improve their survival, thus 
improving their differential reproductive success.
The fundamental law of TNS would have at least three components:
 • The trait that performs certain function more efficiently�
 • The differential reproductive success�
 • The connection between the proper trait and reproductive success, which in these cases obtains 
by means of an improvement in survival�
To arrive at a more general version of the fundamental law of TNS we have to take into account 
that there are explanations that possess the same structure, but in which the connection between the 
proper trait and the improvement in differential reproductive success does not obtain by way of an 
improvement in survival� For instance, in the following case of sexual selection:
“Generally, the most vigorous males, those which are best fitted for their places in nature, 
will leave most progeny� But in many cases, victory will depend not on general vigour, but on 
having special weapons, confined to the male sex� A hornless stag or spurless cock would have 
a poor chance of leaving offspring� Sexual selection by always allowing the victor to breed 
might surely give indomitable courage, length to the spur, and strength to the wing to strike in 
the spurred leg […]” (Darwin 1859, p� 88)�
The law-like statement presupposed in this case would be:
Roosters with spurs more effective for fighting against other roosters tend to mate more, consequently 
improving their differential reproductive success.
In other cases the explanation may resort neither to improvements in survival nor improvements in 
the ability to attract sexual partners� For example:
“Those individual flowers which had the largest glands or nectaries, and which excreted most 
nectar, would be oftenest visited by insects, and would be oftenest crossed; and so in the long-
run would gain the upper hand” (Darwin 1859, p� 92)� 
The law-like statement presupposed would be:
Plants that produce flowers more attractive to insects tend to increase their fertility improving, 
consequently, their success in differential reproduction.
The concept that varies through the different applications Darwin makes of his theory is proposed 
with TNS to explain what it purports to� It is an abstract concept that receives different interpretations 
and that affords Darwin many different explanations� The connection between the trait that is 
adequate for the environment and success in differential reproduction does not always obtain by 
means of an improvement in survival, as is generally supposed� If we call this concept “aptitude”, the 
fundamental law of TNS could be:
Individuals with traits that perform certain function better improve their aptitude, thus improving 
their success in differential reproduction.
These are some of the fundamental concepts of the theory� There are others that I have not considered, 
such as that of environment or that of inheritance� But with this presentation it can already be seen 
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that the structure is more complex than is usually acknowledged, as much in textbook presentations 
as in available reconstructions�
We can find different instantiations of this structure in the different special laws that arise from the 
several instantiations of the concept of aptitude throughout Darwins’s writings� It is interesting to 
notice that this very same wide explanatory structure, that does not always include an improvement 
in survival, can already be found in Darwin’s earliest evolutionist writings� For example:
“[…] if the number of individuals of a species with plumed seeds could be increased by greater 
powers of dissemination within its own area (that is if the check to increase fell chiefly on 
the seeds), those seeds which were provided with ever so little more down, or with a plume 
placed so as to be slightly more acted on by the winds, would in the long run tend to be most 
disseminated; and hence a greater number of seeds thus formed would germinate, and would 
tend to produce plants inheriting this slightly better adapted down” (Darwin 1844: 92)� 
In this case the instantiation of the fundamental law would be:
Organisms whose seeds have traits that allow them to glide in the air spread their seeds better, thus 
improving their success in differential reproduction.
It is also interesting to point that in Darwin himself we can find adaptations presented at a wider level 
than that of the individual:
“[…] it may be believed that under certain circumstances individual differences in the curvature 
or length of the proboscis, &c�, too slight to be appreciated by us, might profit a bee or other 
insect, so that certain individuals would be able to obtain their food more quickly than others; 
and thus the communities to which they belonged would flourish and throw off many swarms 
inheriting the same peculiarities” (Darwin 1872, pp� 74-75)� 
The law-like statement presupposed in the explanation would be the following:
Bees whose tongues have the most effective curvedness or length to collect nectar from certain 
flowers will improve the performance of the community they belong to, improving the differential 
reproductive success of that community.
Fig. 1: Theory-net for the theory of natural selection
All these explanations 
share the same 
structure and there is 
an interesting sense in 
which it can be held 
that they are part of 
the same theory, even 
though Darwin himself 
uses the expression 
“natural selection” in 
a more restricted sense 
on certain occasions� 
Only if we consider 
this wide theory of 
natural selection can 
we understand why, 
according to Darwin, 
the strongest reason to 
accept the theory is its 
unifying force�
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Structuralists use the expression “theory-net” (Balzer, Moulines & Sneed 1987) to refer to the web 
of special laws that arise by specialization from the fundamental law and that constitute the most 
usual sense that in practice is given to the term “theory”� The theory-net based on the different 
specializations of aptitude would look like figure 1�
Nature of the variation
The fundamental law of the theory of natural selection as has been presented in the previous 
section presupposes the existence of the variation� In a given population it is possible to explain the 
differences in reproductive success only if there are differences regarding traits of the organisms 
from such population that imply differences in aptitude� But, as can be seen in the texts from Darwin 
reproduce above, he says nothing about the origin or the causes of the variation� That is because he 
just ignored them:
“Our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound� Not in one case out of a hundred can we 
pretend to assign any reason why this or that part differs, more or less, from the same part 
in the parents� But whenever we have the means of instituting a comparison, the same laws 
appear to have acted in producing the lesser differences between varieties of the same species, 
and the greater differences between species of the same genus” (Darwin 1859: 167)�
Darwin was aware that he did not know the causes of variation� He only knew some empirical 
generalizations regarding them� The theory of natural selection was born independently from any 
theory about the causes of variation and its behavior, building upon the empirical fact of phenotypical 
variation� Did Darwin consider that the variation over which natural selection operated ought to be 
“blind” in the sense explained above? In countless places in the Origin of Species Darwin subscribes 
to what Mayr calls “soft inheritance” (Mayr 1982: 687-698)� In a characterization anachronical for its 
application to Darwin’s ideas, Mayr describes the belief in soft inheritance as the belief that genetic 
material was flexible� Of course, Darwin did not speak of genetic material in any way, but there 
are two beliefs of his that, according to Mayr, would imply the belief in soft inheritance� The belief 
in the direct effects of the environment and in the effects of use and disuse as causes of evolution� 
Regarding the direct influence of the environment we can find many passages in which Darwin 
holds that the direct action of the environment could have had some influence in the production of 
the races� For instance:
“Some little effect may, perhaps, be attributed to the direct action of the external conditions of 
life” (Darwin 1859: 29)�
or,
“How much direct effect difference of climate, food, &c�, produces on any being is extremely 
doubtful� My impression is, that the effect is extremely small in the case of animals, but perhaps 
rather more in that of plants” (Darwin 1859: 132)� 
As for the effects of use and disuse,
“I think there can be little doubt that use in our domestic animals strengthens and enlarges 
certain parts, and disuse diminishes them; and that such modifications are inherited” (Darwin 
1859: 134)�
These passages show that Darwin thought that the direct instruction of the environment and the 
two laws from Lamarck mentioned before work as mechanisms alternative to natural selection� 
This is possible only because Darwin, in effect, thought of inheritance as “soft”� But these 
mechanisms also have an interesting role regarding our current issue� Darwin is explicit in 
holding that those mechanisms worked, in addition, as causes of the variation over which natural 
selection operated:
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“I may add, that when under nature the conditions of life do change, variations and reversions 
of character probably do occur; but natural selection, as will hereafter be explained, will 
determine how far the new characters thus arising shall be preserved” (Darwin 1859: 15)�
Near the end of the chapter dedicated to the laws of variation, after revisiting all the possible causes 
of variations, among which we find use and disuse and the influence of the environment:
“Whatever the cause may be of each slight difference in the offspring from their parents—
and a cause for each must exist—it is the steady accumulation, through natural selection, of 
such differences, when beneficial to the individual, that gives rise to all the more important 
modifications of structure, by which the innumerable beings on the face of this earth are 
enabled to struggle with each other, and the best adapted to survive” (Darwin 1859: 170)�
Darwin, therefore, believed that the variations over which the selective mechanisms ran could be 
caused by direct influence of the environment and as a result of use and disuse� That variations 
might be caused by the influence of environmental conditions goes against Campbell’s requisite 
(2) mentioned before that variation should be blind� That they might be caused by use and disuse is 
incompatible with requisites (3) and (4)� That is, the variation for Darwin did not need to be blind in 
Campbell’s sense (Hodgson 2001: 103-105; Kronfeldner 2007: 499)� 
The additional explanatory power of the Darwinian theory of natural selection consisted precisely 
in that it could work on variations that did not depend on habit and were, therefore, more or less 
spontaneous� The force of the theory lay in that the variation might not arise as a response to the 
demands of the environment� But it did not have to be like this in all cases� The issue of it being 
impossible to distinguish between Lamarckian and Darwinian mechanisms if variation is blind can, 
I think, be eluded by paying attention to the complexity of the explanation� On the other hand, there 
is no risk either of the theory of natural selection becoming vacuous or irrefutable by making it more 
general than the version that works only on blind variations, since each of its parts is independently 
testable� If we claim, for instance, that fowl with tails with certain characteristics are more attractive 
to females and, therefore, get to mate more, improving their reproductive success, each of these 
claims can be tested by empirical means, with absolute independence of the nature of the variation� 
Finally, if the variation was generated by non-blind mechanisms, this does not make natural selection 
irrelevant, since the particular variation obtained non-blindly might still improve or worsen the 
reproductive success of the organism (Dawkins 1986: 300)�
Darwinian cultural adaptions
As we saw, Darwin thought it possible for natural selection to work over directed variations� This 
makes it conceptually possible for the theory he devised to be applied to cultural evolution� But, in 
addition, he expressed, even if on few occasions, his openness to applying his theory without the 
need that variations be transmitted through hereditary material (Lewens 2008):
“Now, if some one man in a tribe, more sagacious than the others, invented a new snare or 
weapon, or other means of attack or defence, the plainest self-interest, without the assistance 
of much reasoning power, would prompt the other members to imitate him; and all would thus 
profit� The habitual practice of each new art must likewise in some slight degree strengthen 
the intellect� If the new invention were an important one, the tribe would increase in number, 
spread, and supplant other tribes” (Darwin 1874: 129)�
In this case the trait arises as a response to a need, that is, by a directed non-blind variation, and the 
inheritance mechanism is not genetics, but imitation� We can find, however, the same structure as 
in the cases considered� There is a trait, in this case a cultural one, the new technological artifact, 
and there is an improvement in the aptitude of the tribe that will lead to an improvement in its 
reproductive success� It is a case of selection at group level�
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Another interesting case is the following:
“We see variability in every tongue, and new words are continually cropping up; but as there 
is a limit to the powers of the memory, single words, like whole languages, gradually become 
extinct� As Max Müller has well remarked:—”A struggle for life is constantly going on 
amongst the words and grammatical forms in each language� The better, the shorter, the easier 
forms are constantly gaining the upper hand, and they owe their success to their own inherent 
virtue�” To these more important causes of the survival of certain words, mere novelty and 
fashion may be added; for there is in the mind of man a strong love for slight changes in all 
things� The survival or preservation of certain favoured words in the struggle for existence is 
natural selection” (Darwin 1874: 90-91)�
In this case, the theory of natural selection does not even apply to living organisms, but, in a way that 
seems to anticipate memetics, to forms of language� The Darwinian theory of natural selection, in 
addition to being consistent with it, was applied to cultural evolution by Darwin himself�
Conclusion
I have presented a sketch of the fundamental law of the theory of natural selection as it was conceived 
by Darwin and of the several ways in which it was applied� I have tried to show that if the claim that 
cultural evolution is Lamarckian only holds that cultural traits obtained as a response to demands of 
the environment are transmitted to offspring through imitation or more complex forms of learning, 
that does not imply that natural selection cannot play an explanatory role regarding the evolution of 
traits of this kind� This supposed inconsistency is based on the usually held idea that natural selection 
works over a blind variation and, as we saw, it is possible to hold versions of natural selection that 
only require variation� One example is the theory as it was conceived by Darwin� Of course, one 
can hold, as many epistemologists do (such as Popper or Campbell), that cultural evolution is not 
Lamarckian in this sense� But if it was, that does not imply that it cannot be studied in a Darwinian 
way� The use of the phrase “cultural evolution, in opposition to biological evolution, is Lamarckian” 
as it is usually used to attack Darwinian studies of cultural evolution, does not have any conceptual 
ground at all�
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